On Tuesday, the United States District Court of California issued an order requiring Apple to assist the FBI in accessing a locked iPhone — and not just any iPhone, but the iPhone 5c used by one of the San Bernardino shooters. The order is very clear: build new firmware to enable the FBI to perform an unlimited, high speed brute force attack and place that firmware on the device.
Dan Guido argues that the request is technically feasible given that Apple can sign firmware updates to the Secure Enclave:
I believe it is technically feasible for Apple to comply with all of the FBI's requests in this case. On the iPhone 5C, the passcode delay and device erasure are implemented in software and Apple can add support for peripheral devices that facilitate PIN code entry. In order to limit the risk of abuse, Apple can lock the customized version of iOS to only work on the specific recovered iPhone and perform all recovery on their own, without sharing the firmware image with the FBI.
Despite the technical feasibility and the emotion of a terrible domestic terrorism case, Apple is fighting this order as the act of coercing a company to defeat their own security measures using a law from 1789 could lead to dangerous precedence for future cases and for encryption at large. Tim Cook's letter shows that Apple well understands the legal precedent this could set and is resolutely opposed:
The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.
I applaud Apple's stance and support the continued adoption of strong encryption and security measures to protect us from government and criminals alike.