The Biden administration is embarking on the nation’s first comprehensive plan to regulate the security practices of cloud providers.
Identifying and containing [...] compromised user accounts, therefore, prevents attacks from progressing, even if attackers gain initial access. This is why, as announced today, we added user containment to the automatic attack disruption capability in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, a unique and innovative defense mechanism that stops human-operated attacks in their tracks. User containment prevents a compromised user account from accessing endpoints and other resources in the network, limiting attackers’ ability to move laterally regardless of the account’s Active Directory state or privilege level. It is automatically triggered by high-fidelity signals indicating that a compromised user account is being used in an ongoing attack. With user containment, even compromised domain admin accounts cannot help attackers access other devices in the network.
Unlike my typical blog entries, this blog is a very serious deep-dive into the C2PA provenance solution for photos, video, and other kinds of media. This solution is in the process of being adopted by hundreds of commercial organizations, from newsrooms and human rights observers to camera manufacturers and financial institutions. I explicitly cover multiple security-related issues in the C2PA specification that enable a wide range of fraudulent activities, from the small-time catphishers and online merchant scammers to nation-state propaganda efforts and large-scale financial fraud. Consumers and corporations need to be aware: C2PA does not provide reliable and validated information about a photo's origins.
[The credit header] is personal information that the credit bureaus Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion have on most adults in America via their credit cards. Through a complex web of agreements and purchases, that data trickles down from the credit bureaus to other companies who offer it to debt collectors, insurance companies, and law enforcement.
A 404 Media investigation has found that criminals have managed to tap into that data supply chain, in some cases by stealing former law enforcement officer’s identities, and are selling unfettered access to their criminal cohorts online.
All of the big pharmacy chains in the US hand over sensitive medical records to law enforcement without a warrant—and some will do so without even running the requests by a legal professional, according to a congressional investigation.
It has long been possible to tap someone’s phone or put a bug in their home and/or car, but those things still require someone to listen to and make sense of the conversations. [...] Spying is limited by the need for human labor.
AI is about to change that.
The good news is that there’s a plan to almost eliminate latency, and big companies like Apple, Google, Comcast, Charter, Nvidia, Valve, Nokia, Ericsson, T-Mobile parent company Deutsche Telekom, and more have shown an interest. It’s a new internet standard called L4S that was finalized and published in January, and it could put a serious dent in the amount of time we spend waiting around for webpages or streams to load and cut down on glitches in video calls.
The companies had honed a protocol for releasing artificial intelligence ambitiously but safely. Then OpenAI’s board exploded all their carefully laid plans.
AI image generators like Stable Diffusion and DALL-E amplify bias in gender and race, despite efforts to detoxify the data fueling these results.
In the beginning of 2023, [...] we noticed suspicious network activity that turned out to be an ongoing attack targeting the iPhones and iPads of our colleagues. The moment we understood that there was a clear pattern in the connections, and that the devices could have been infected, we initiated a standard digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) protocol for such cases – moving around the office, collecting the devices, and inspecting their contents. The ultimate goal was to locate and extract the malware, to find the point of entry (hopefully, a 0-day) and to develop a protocol for scanning the iDevices for active infection. That process turned into a months-long journey, and in this article we would like to summarize it.